A sylum status determination has had a very difficult press in recent years, in part because of the considerable media interest in the subject. Asylum stories have been pouring out of the developed world's newspapers. By way of an example, the Belgian press has not been far behind some of the British media in highlighting the problems arising out of those seeking asylum. Thus on 11 October 1999 it was reported that: ' Political parties across Europe, in Switzerland and Austria in particular, have benefited from the concerns of those who wish to 'halt a rising tide of would-be immigrants'. In Ghent, as in Dover, city leaders are reported to have said that there has to be a stop to this, because the tolerance threshold has vanished.
Media coverage in the UK of the Stansted Airport hijack incident illustrates in an all too stark form the virtual disintegration of a tolerant level.
In the European context, a high-level working group on Asylum and Migration has been engaged in conducting action plans both for selected countries of origin and for transit across states of asylum seekers. The European Council, at its meeting in Tampere Amongst the general propositions within this statement of policy is an acceptance of common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure and the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of refugee status. Community rules should lead to a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout the Union. This is however a long way off at the present time.
International law norms are essentially underdeveloped and provide little in the way of guidance in developing a model for refugee-status determination. Guy Goodwin-Gill, There is therefore both in international law and practice and in European law an acceptance that there must be some provision for a merits appeal separate from the executive arm of 11 government. It is my view that the merits appeal should be a last resort, to provide a safeguard against a wrong conclusion drawn by the initial decision maker. Unfortunately, this has not been the experience here in the UK. I believe strongly that resources should be front loaded, so that there is high quality initial decision making which would ensure appeal processes would only occasionally be required. A similar point has been made by every report and research project that has looked at this question over recent years. Under-resourcing at the early level simply leads to a paper pushing exercise, whereby cases are shifted from the Home Office to the Immigration Appellate Authorities and where all too often the Adjudicator (the first level of appeal at the Immigration Appellate Authorities) is in effect the first person to provide a serious analysis of the factual and legal situation presented by the applicant. It is both a false economy and a flawed legal system which places emphasis solely on appeal rights.
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LACK OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS
We need a judicial framework to ensure that people who allege that they will be persecuted if returned to their countrv o ^ I y of origin for one of the specified Geneva Convention reasons have their cases fairly and impartially considered. Persecution itself is not an easy concept to handle. Neither are some of the Convention's reasons, especially the definition of 'social group'. And there is no satisfactory international law definition of any of these concepts. To criticise the adjudicators and the tribunal for lack of consistency of approach is easy; but it stems from a failure to have common international law norms, leaving us all free to interpret the Convention as we will.
PRESENT SYSTEM AND ITS DEFECTS
The structure for asylum appeals in the UK has in effect been planted in the same soil as the well-watered system of immigration appeals. The system for immigration appeals was established in the UK in 1970 to deal with appeals from adverse decisions of Home Office officials concerning immigration into the UK either on a short term basis or for indefinite leave, and appeals from entry clearance officers refusing visas. The original suggestion was that there be a tribunal composed of a legally qualified chairman and two lay members hearing appeals from 'subordinate judicial officers' (called adjudicators) at ports. These 'judicial officers' would deal with an appeal immediately after the refusal by an immigration officer and these hearings would be followed by an immediate oral determination.
In practice that never happened, and what has developed is a sophisticated body of procedural rules and case law. This judicialisation, especially in the asylum context, has been much criticised. In desperation, it has been suggested that one tier * CO should be removed, that the lay element of the tribunal should be removed, that judicial review of the refusal by a tribunal chairman of leave to appeal to the tribunal should be abolished, that more cases should be subjected to an expedited procedure, that draconian case management and time consequences should be imposed. The legislation in 1993 The legislation in , 1996 The legislation in and now 1999 all been directed at accelerating the procedures.
I personally believe that the emphasis on the procedural aspects of the issue hides the fundamental issue. We need a judicial framework to ensure that people who allege that they will be persecuted if returned to their country of origin for one of the specified Geneva Convention reasons have their cases fairly and impartially considered. Persecution itself is not an easy concept to handle. Neither are some of the Convention reasons, especially the definition of 'social group'. And there is no satisfactory international law definition of any of these concepts. To criticise the adjudicators and the tribunal for lack of consistency of approach is easy; but it stems from a failure to have common international law norms, leaving us all free to interpret the Convention as we will.
Judicial review is a blunt instrument, emphasising procedural defects, for example, in cases where a chairman of a tribunal has refused leave to appeal to itself, or where an adjudicator has dismissed an accelerated 'certified' appeal.
The current structure of appeals has not made it easy to provide answers to the complex questions of substantive law; for example to set out a consistent framework for issues such as internal flight, persecution in the context of a civil war (that is, being caught in the crossfire), and when discrimination becomes persecution.
A PROPOSAL
The time has come, in my view^ to grasp the nettle of judicial review. Much of my time as President was spent either agreeing to Treasury Solicitor's proposals to quash a chairman's refusal of leave to appeal to the tribunal or trying, usually unsuccessfully, to persuade him to fight a judicial review challenge. I was never certain of the constitutional position of these deliberations, not least in that although technically the tribunal's decision is the one which is being challenged, the tribunal is not itself represented, and the Treasury Solicitor's client is the Secretary of State, who is a party to the proceedings before the Immigration Appellate Authorities. The volume of appeals is compounded by tight time limits, and failure by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to consider the application for leave to appeal to itself within the specified time limits results in leave to appeal having been deemed to have been granted. Rigid time limits for filing grounds for appeal from the adjudicators to the tribunal, and draconian results for the tribunal if they fail to deal with the matter within further tight time scales, are counter-productive. Representatives have little choice but to file protective appeals (even the Secretary of State docs this); and chairmen have little time to deal with the appeal except by way of a formulaic procedure.
I would suggest that the opportunity should be taken to consider a complete overhaul of administrative justice, for some of the difficulties outlined here in relation to asylum status determination apply equally in other tribunal structures. I believe that the larger tribunal systems, especially Immigration and Asylum, Mental Health, Employment, and the Social Security and Tax Tribunals, should be loosely co-ordinated into an administrative court, with a second tier being granted a Court of Record status with High Court Judges serving as chairmen.
There should then be an appeal from these courts on a point of law to the Court of Appeal. Judicial review would be available, of course, in the event of any procedural error within the system, but I suspect that the Crown Office would not be engaged to any great extent. The Australian model of a multijurisdictional Administrative Appeal Tribunal bears close scrutiny. Judicial review has played its part in developing the system of administrative law in this country, but now, with the 
